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 This study deals with all the problematic issues surrounding the use of intellectual 
property as “collateral,” analyzing two legal systems, and addressing that the time has 
come for the enactment of laws which regulate how security interest in intellectual 
property should effect. This study also points out the importance of intellectual property 
rights as another asset in business transactions and the difficulties that the valuation 
process presents. The central idea of this work is that if lenders and borrowers can 
successfully utilize IP assets for collateral, borrowers can tap and additional source of 
funding, and creditors can finance a broader range of customers, leading to continued 
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rather as a tool for clarification. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A look at the world around us – a world enlivened by books, recordings, films, 
and theatre; by the science that runs our computers, creates new uses for genes, and spins 
the strands of the Internet; by colorful presence of brand names products in our homes – 
instantly reveals that intellectual property (IP) exerts a powerful influence on our lives.1 
Copyright gives the owner of those films, books, and software exclusive rights to their 
commercial exploitation; patents endow biotechnology innovators with the exclusive 
right to manufacture and market the products derived from their inventions; and 
trademarks provide the owner of those brands with the exclusive right to use them in 
commerce.2 
 As intellectual property has grown in significance, its use as collateral by the 
corporate entities controlling it has also expanded. However, the practice of using IP as 
collateral to secure financing is over a century old. In the late 1880’s, Thomas Edison 
used his patent on the incandescent electric light as collateral to borrow money to start his 
own company.3 That business would eventually become the General Electric Company.4 
                                                 
1 Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interets: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, COLUM. 
L. REV. 1647 (1996).  
2 Id. 
3 ANDRE MILLARD, EDISON AND THE BUSINESS OF INNOVATION, 43 - 46 (1990). 
4  Id. at 130. 
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Similarly, the problems associated with trying to obtain financing on the basis of IP are 
also old ones.  
 Generally, commercial lenders are reluctant to use IP as collateral due to the 
confusion surrounding the proper method to perfect it. Lenders may also struggle with 
determinations of applicable law, and assessment of infringement liability. Finally, even 
the assignation of a real dollar value to intellectually properties is exceedingly difficult  
 As more deals include IP, more lawyers (including corporate lawyers, and not just 
IP specialists), must wrestle with complex and arcane issues in the course of advising 
their clients.5 When a client extends a multimillion dollar loan, one of the most important 
closing documents it requires is an opinion letter from its counsel assuring it that if it 
takes certain steps, its security interest will be properly perfected and will have priority 
over other claims.6 
 This study will analyze the issues surrounding the use of IP as “collateral,”7 
through the analysis of two different legal systems, that of the United States and that of 
Argentina. Part One will point out the importance of intellectual property rights (IPRs) as 
an asset in business transactions as well as the difficulties that they present in the 
valuation process.  
 Part Two will address the legal scheme for protection of IPRs. This section will 
also tackle two of the most difficult issues in IP, namely the nature of IPRs and its 
definition as a property. There is also an analysis of the baselines IP laws in Argentina 
and The United States (U.S.), which reflects the connection of both systems. 
                                                 
5 See Alice Haemmerli, supra note 1, at 1649. 
6 Id. 
7 Collateral is used in the everyday sense to mean property that is offered by a borrower to secure a loan; if 
the borrower defaults, the lender forecloses on the property. 
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 Part Three deals with a deeper analysis of security interest in both legal system, 
the Argentinean and the American, focusing on the issues surrounding the proper 
methods of perfecting these interests. In addition, this will deal with the enforcing of 
security interest in IPRs.  The central idea of this work is that if lenders and borrowers 
can successfully utilize IP assets for collateral, borrowers can tap and additional source of 
funding, and creditors can finance a broader range of customers, leading to continued 
economic growth and development when the law is no longer used as an obstacle, but 
rather as a tool for clarification. 
 
A. THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 Before considering the legal framework for the protection of IPRs, it is important 
to briefly outline why IPRs have become an important asset in business transactions. 
Although many authors have attempted to explain the role of IPRs in commercial 
transactions from varying viewpoints, there are essentially three basic reasons explaining 
why IPRs have become so important. 
 First, there is what the New York Times referred to in 1998 as “merger mania.”8 
Merger and Acquisition (M&A) activity has raised awareness of the importance of IP in 
company valuation and deal financing. IP is fast becoming the most important asset 
possessed by a corporation.9  
                                                 
8 Leslie Wayne, Wave of Mergers is Recasting Face of Business in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1998 at A1. 
9 GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE 
ASSETS at vii (1989) 
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 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimated in 1998 that M & A would 
exceed 4,500 in number and $2 trillion in market value.10 Among all the transactions in 
1998, two of them illustrate the aforementioned importance of IPRs. First, Grand 
Metropolitan of Great Britain acquired the Pillsbury Company for $5.7 billon. In 
obtaining the Pillsbury Company, Grand Metropolitan of Great Britain’s primary purpose 
was to acquire such powerful brands as Burger King, Green Giant, and Haagen-Dazs.11 
Second, Nestle S.A. paid $ 4.5 billon to obtain the Rowntree Corporation acquiring such 
brands as Rolls, Kit Kat and After Eight.12 In the pharmaceutical arena, there was the 
merger between SmithKline Beecham and Glaxo Welcome.13 According to the FTC, this 
transaction had an estimated market capitalization of $182 billion, representing annual 
sales of $26 billion.14  
 Although we do not have information regarding the exact value of the IPRs in the 
aforementioned transactions, their value is implicit. Had IP not been taken into account, 
and the value of companies measured only in tangible goods, the true value of the 
companys’ assets would have been grossly underestimated. 
 In addition to merger mania, the high cost of introducing new brands into the 
marketplace, combined with the high failure rate of new brands, has enhanced 
perceptions about the value of already established trademark franchises. For example, the 
                                                 
10 Remarks of Hon. Robert Pitofsky, Chairman FTC, before committee on the Judiciary, Merger and 
Corporate Consolidation, United States Senate , June 1998.  
11 Melvin Simensky, The New Role of Iintellectual Property in Commercial Transacition, 10 ENT. & 
SPORTS. L. 5,5 (1992). 
12 The Purest Treasure, The Economist, Sept. 7, 1991, at 67. 
13 David K. Morrow & Laura M. Holson, Drug Merger Studied, With New Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan, 31, 
1998 at D1. 
14 Mitchell J. Katz, Resolving Competitive Concerns, FTC Agreement Clears $182 Billion Merger of 
SmithKline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome, December 18, 2000 available at 
www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/skb.htm, last visited (April 2, 2003). 
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domestic launch of a new soap brand is a $100 million venture, a new cigarette brand a 
$300 million gamble.15 And these estimates do not even include the heavy cost of 
promoting new brands in the initial years. Ten thousand new products are introduced 
annually. Of these, 80 percent fail. Fewer than 1 percent will ever obtain annual sales of 
$15 million.16 Consequently, existing brands, especially those with global reputations, are 
very valuable. Some private reports show the importance of IP. 17  In 1997, the Campbell 
Soup Company Annual Report emphasized “Brand Power” as the second of its major 
business precepts driving economic growth.18 As a consequence the existing patents are 
also valuable.19 
 The third factor contributing to the rising importance of IPRs may be referred to 
as economic globalization. Internationalization of trade has forced countries worldwide to 
enter into trade agreements, forming regional trade blocs.20 This trend is reflected in the 
following trade agreements: Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR),21 the North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),22 and the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).23  
                                                 
15 See Melvin Simensky, supra note 11, at 5. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Gavin Clarkson, Avoiding Suboptimal Behavior in Intellectual Asset Transactions: Economic and 
Organizational Perspectives on the sale of Knowledge. HARV. J. L. & TECH 712 (2001). 
19 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, GEO. L.J. 291 (December 1988). 
20 Lurinda L. Hicks and James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in 
International Trading Agreements, Am. U.J. INT’L. L. &  POL’Y  771 (1997).  
21 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion on March 26, 1991, creating 
MERCOSUR. Today, due to the significant differences among national intellectual property laws, different 
levels of infrastructure in the individual member nations’ governmental bodies charged with the application 
of such laws, and flagrant macroeconomic differences within the region, the process of harmonization of 
intellectual property norms within the MERCOSUR is tentative. See Treaty establishing the Common 
Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and 
the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, 30 I.L.M. 1041, 1991. 
22 The NAFTA is a free trade Agreement among Canada, Mexico and U.S. The preamble of the NAFTA 
sets forth a desire to “foster creativity and innovation and promote trade goods and services that are the 
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 As a result of economic integration and technological advance, IPRs are now 
considered global commodities.24 Yet despite the importance of intellectual assets 
transactions25 it would seem that they remain among the least understood types of 
economics transactions, and perhaps also the most poorly managed.26 A closer look at the 
nature of IP in section I may provide a better understanding of the importance of IPRs in 
business transactions. 
 
B. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VALUATION 
 While IP plays an important role in today’s business transactions, it remains very 
difficult to quantify its economic value.  It seems strange that IP assets have not been 
given the same rigorous scrutiny and analysis by the financial community as tangible 
assets of a deal.27 Some of the reasons that explain why IP assets are more difficult to 
evaluate than tangible assets are: (i) the exchange of IP assets is sporadic and only 
motivated by strategic advantages, rather than real estate. The public trading markets that 
exist for financial and physical assets do not exist for IP assets;28 (ii) the terms and 
conditions of IP transfers vary widely and rarely are two transactions ever the same; (iii) 
                                                                                                                                                 
subject of IPRs.” See North America Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 612 signed Dec. 17, 1992. Preamble 
at 1. 
23 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1197, in General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, 3 I.L.M. 1125, Annex 1 C. 
24 See Lurinda L. Hicks, supra note 20, at 771. 
25 Lesley Ellen Harris, Digital Property: Currency of the 21st Century,  51 (1998) The author states that in 
1998, in the global economy the 20 percent of the world trade (representing $ 740billon) are exclusive IP 
transactions.  
26 See Gavin Clarkson, supra note 18, at 715. 
27 Edward J Kessler and Robert Greene Sterne, Intellectual Property Considerations of Corporate 
Partnering, Patent, Copyright, Trademark and Literary Property Course Book Handbook (PLI Order No. 
G4-3836), 128 (March 1989). WL 277 PLI/Pat 107  
28 The online intellectual property exchanges, such as plx.com, yet2.com and Delphion, have not yet 
developed into broad-based public markets. 
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IP assets are inherently dissimilar. Patents must be novel and nonobvious compared to 
prior art29 copyrights must be original works of authorship30 and trademarks must be 
distinctive;31 and, (iv) the details of IP transfers are rarely made available to the public.32 
 Understanding the valuation of IP is critical because its real value is often 
underestimated.  In actual practice the value is inherently subjective and valuation 
methods inherently uncertain. Aristotle stated “that it is a sign of an educated mind not to 
expect more certainty from a subject that it can possibly provide.”33 Applying this idea, 
valuation in IP requires an intermediate perspective between certainty and ignorance, and 
this requires the exercise of skill, experience, and judgment. 
 In fact, the price of the IP is influenced by innumerable factors. Thus, IP lenders 
must specifically determine the appropriate valuation approach, choosing from among 
disparate methods such as cost approach,34 the market approach,35 the income approach,36 
and the rule of thumb or 25 percent rule.37 All four approaches represent different 
valuation methods based upon to different philosophies. The Cost approach determines 
                                                 
29 35 USC §§ 101-103 (2001) 
30 17 USC § 102(a) (1995) 
31 17 USC § 1052(f) 1997) 
32Ted Habelin, A New Method to Value Intellectual Property, AIPLA QUARTERLY JOURNAL, 354 (2002). 
33 RICHARD RAZGAITIS, EARLY STAGE TECHNOLOGIES: VALUATION AND PRICING, 7 (1999). 
34 The Cost approach measures the value of an asset by the cost to replace or reproduce it with an identical 
or equivalent asset. See Ted Habelin, supra note 32 at 359 (citing ROBERT C. MEGANTZ, HOW TO LICENSE 
TECHNOLOGY, 56 (1996). 
35 The Market approach values an asset based upon comparable transactions between unrelated parties. 
When the market approach is used, an indication of the value of a specific item of IP can be gained from 
looking at the price paid for comparable property. See Brian M. Daniel, et al, Financial Aspects of 
Licensing Agreements; Valuation of and Auditing, PATENT, COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK AND LITERARY 
PROPERTY COURSE BOOK SERIES (PLI Order No. G0-00JR), 94 (March 2001).  
36 The income method values an asset based upon the present value of the net economic benefit (net future 
income stream) expected to be received over the life of the asset. See GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. 
PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS   247 (1989). 
37 There are many definitions of this method, but the most accurate is that “the licensor should receive 25 
percent of the licensee’s gross profit from the licensed technology.” See RICHARD RAZGAITIS, supra note 
33 at 370. 
  8
the value by way of the historical or present cost of forming the assets; the Market 
approach determines the value by way of the present transaction price in the market; the 
Income approach determines the value by way of the future capabilities of obtaining 
profits, while the 25 Percent rule is the simplest, most flexible and most often referenced 
valuation method mentioned that can complement the other methods.  Although each of 
these approaches has limitations, together they provide IP lenders with a set of basic 
useful decision-making tools. 
  9
 
 
CHAPTER II 
THE LEGAL SCHEME FOR PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
“Ideas, like wild animals, 
are yours while they continue in your possession; but no longer.” 
(Justice Yates in Milar v. Taylor, 1769)38 
 
A. DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: SPECIAL 
NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL ASSETS 
 
  Many texts on IP law begin by saying something about the definition of IP.39 
These definitions may be defined as definition by extension or intention. An extensional 
definition of IP would list certain traditional core areas such as copyrights, patents, 
trademarks, design, protection against unfair competition and the protection of trade 
secret. Intentional definitions of IP are harder to formulate. However, following the line 
of reasoning of Mr. Peter Dahos in his work A Philosophy of Intellectual Property,”40 it 
can be stated that “IPRs are rule-governed privileges that regulate the ownership and 
exploitation of abstract objects in many field of human activity.” 
 Three distinct philosophies about the nature of IP and its protection have 
developed over time: 
                                                 
38 Grosheide, F.W., When Ideas Take the Stage, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 220 (1994). 
39 PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1 (1996). Noting that It was customary to 
refer industrial and intellectual property rights. The term “industrial” was used to cover technology-based 
subject areas like patents and designs. “Intellectual Property was used to refer to copyright and its cultural 
subject matter. 
40 Id. 5 
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(i)  The natural rights view, stemming from some European traditions, assigns 
ownership of mental creation to their inventors under the precept that failure 
to do so constitutes theft of the fruits of their effort and inspiration.41 Creators 
should have the right to control any reworking of their ideas and expressions. 
This moral view of IPRs exists independently of any thoughts about the 
incentive effects or economic cost and benefits of regulation. This approach is 
evidence today in the strong protection of artistic moral rights in European 
Law.42 
(ii)  Under the public rights view, it is inappropriate to assign private property 
rights in intellectual creations. Information belongs in the public domain 
because free access to information is central to social cohesion and learning. 
This approach found its strongest application in socialist systems, which did 
not recognize the notion of private ownership of intellectual assets. The task 
of generating knowledge fell to the state; the fruits of its invention were 
provided widely to potential users.43 
(iii) There is much room between these extreme positions for recognizing that 
IPRs may be assigned and regulated for purposes of social and economic 
policy. Most legal system adopt a utilitarian view, in which IPRs strike a 
balance between the need for invention and creation, on the one hand, and the 
need for the dissemination of information on the other. Private property rights 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 28 
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in information bear both benefits and costs, suggesting that they may be 
designed with incentives and trade-offs.44 
 
 For the purpose of this study, the utilitarian view will be adopted to define IP as a 
primary class of intangible assets.45 The first half of this definition, intangible, is based 
on the Roman law, which distinguished between corporeal (tangible) and incorporeal 
(intangible) property. Classical Roman Law, the Institute of Gaius, divided all law into 
laws relating to persons, things or actions. The distinction between incorporeal and 
corporeal occurs in the law of things (res). It is stated by Gaius in the following way: 
Further things are divided into corporeal and incorporeal. 13 Corporeal 
things are tangible things, such as land, a slave, a garment, gold, silver 
and countless other things. 14. Incorporeal are things that are 
intangible, such as exist merely in law for example, for example an 
inheritance, a usufruct, obligation however contracted.46 
 
 IPRs are properly classified as incorporeal rights. 
 The second half of the definition, assets, is based on economic principle.  Human 
thought is astonishingly creative in finding solutions to applied technical and scientific 
problems, in communicating the existence and quality of products and persuading 
consumers to buy them, and in expressing images and ideas. These intellectual efforts 
create new technologies, products, and services, describe new ways of doing things, and 
expand the cultural richness of society.47 They result in intellectual assets, pieces of 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 See Gavin Clarkson, supra note 18, at 715 
46 See PETER DRAHOS, supra note 39 at 16. (Citing the Institutes of Gaius (F De Zuleta (ed. And tr.) Oxford 
at the Claredon Press, 1946), Book II, 12 – 14. 
47 KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, 27 (2000). 
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information that may have economic value of put into the market place. These assets are 
called Intellectual Property.48 The legal devices that provide such control are called IPRs. 
 
1. Characterizing Property 
 As intangible assets, IPRs protect IP owner’s rights to legal benefits including the 
right to charge rent for use, to receive compensation for loss and collect payment for 
transfer and sale.49 IP constructs a scarcity in knowledge where none necessarily exists.50 
IP replaces knowledge’s largely non-rival character with a regime of rival property. 
Generally, it is necessary for a price to be taken and for the benefits of ownership to be 
obtained.51 Space precludes a long discussion of how this imposition of scarcity has been 
justified, but the three narratives that are used in various combinations will be familiar.52 
 The first argument is that effort deserves reward.53 This draws on a long line of 
political theory starting with John Locke’s argument about property rights in previously 
common land should be awarded to the diligent cultivator.54 It has now become a more 
general argument that not only should effort be rewarded, but that stimulation of useful 
human activity is vital and necessary. The effort expended to produce any particular 
knowledge or information should be rewarded by bestowing of property rights in 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE NEW 
ENCLOSURE? 7 (2000). 
50 Christopher May, Why IPRS Are a Global Political Issue, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 2 (2003). 
51 Id. 
52 CHRISTOPHER MAY, supra note 49, at 5 
53 See Christopher May, supra note 50, at 2. 
54 PETER DRAHOS, supra note 39 at 45. 
  13
whatever is produced.55 This encourages further intellectual activity by establishing a 
clear benefit to the producer.  
 Secondly, IPRs also reflect the rights of individuals to own the products of their 
own efforts, because these efforts reflect the expression of the individual’s self-identity. 
Thus individuals should be allowed to own IP in the product of their mental activity, 
because it is their mental work that has produced the property.56 This draws on the 
Hegelian notion of property as a form of protection from interference by others or the 
state.57 In Europe, this conception of property has prompted the recognition of a moral 
right of creators and authors to ensure that their work remains as they intended even after 
economic right have be transferred.58 
 The third narrative of IP is more closely related to the capitalist character of 
modern society. The argument here focuses on the benefits of introducing market into 
any particular area of social existence.59 Markets promote efficiency of use. Thus, in 
order to ensure that ideas and knowledge are used efficiently, and to the maximum 
benefit of society, markets must control the distribution of information and knowledge.60 
 All three narrative constructions support the idea that IP is a form of property and 
as property must to be protected and therefore commercialized in a secure environment. 
                                                 
55 CHRISTOPHER MAY, supra note 49, at 7 
56 See Christopher May, supra note 50, at 2. 
57 PETER DRAHOS, supra note 39 at 45 
58 See Christopher May, supra note 36, at 2. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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However, it is also clear that property rights exist only to the extent that the legal 
system61 is willing to recognize and enforce them.62 
 
B. INSTRUMENTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 
 There are various IPR legal devices or instruments. They determine what subject 
matter is legally protected, the procedure for achieving that protection, the duration of 
protection, and legal remedies for infringement of IPRs.  The main characteristic of these 
instruments is the exclusive right to exclude others from certain activities.63  
 Before defining the legal devices, it is important to point out that this study 
assumes that the differences among national legal systems do not represent profound 
differences in the underlying notions of what IP is all about,64 especially in the U.S. and 
Argentinean scenarios.  Several well subscribed international treaties create international 
standards for what constitutes IP. At the level of national laws, even most socialist 
countries have either recognized roughly similar parameters to IP or have at least averred 
their subscription to the general idea of legal regimes for copyrights, trademarks, patents. 
Of course that it does not mean that there is international uniformity in the protection 
granted to intellectual property, only that there are generally accepted baselines of 
protection.65 
 Professor Marci A. Hamilton has provided an excellent introduction for anyone, 
including not only IP attorneys but also corporate and merger and acquisition attorneys. 
                                                 
61 “Legal System” here refers not only to the courts, but also to legislators and government regulators as 
well. 
62 Dana Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates, Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and The Regulatory 
Implications of Systems Technology,” HASTINGS L. J. 1078, (2000). 
63 See Lurinda L. Hicks, supra note 20, at 772. 
64 Id.   
65 See Justin Hughes, supra note 19 at 293  
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He argued that IP law is now international.66 It is not standardized, it is not harmonized, 
but it is international. One can rarely be certain today that IP product will not cross any 
territorial borders and therefore be subject only to domestic IP law.67 
 
1. Types of Intellectual Property 
 Different forms of IPRs operate in distinct fashions and it is misleading to group 
them together.68  Indeed designing an effective and appropriate system of IPRs is 
complex for any country.69  Some broad definitions of IPRs will help establish the terrain 
over which we will range. This study is focused only on copyright, patent, and trademark 
and does not address other important forms of IP such us trade secrets, domain names; 
industrial models.  
 (i) Copyrights: Copyrights protect original works of authorship. Copyrights and 
related rights protect artistic creativity in many forms, including literature, the authorship 
or composition of musical and performed (including choreographic) works, architecture, 
and the graphic (including advertisements, maps, drawings, photographs, and technical 
drawings), dramatic, cinematic, performing, and plastic arts. The concept has also often 
been extended as a result of developments in technologies to include such things as 
software design.70 Copyright protection typically lasts for the life of the author plus 50 to 
70 years.71 The rights provided by copyright apply to authors but related rights, also 
                                                 
66 Marci Hamilton, “The Top Ten Intellectual Property Law Questions That Should Be Asked About Any 
Merger or Acquisition.” U. CIN. L. REV. 1315 (1998).  
67 Id. 
68 Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 474 
(2000). 
69  KETITH MARKUS, supra note 47, at 28.  
70 G. GREGORY LETTERMAN, BASIC OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 256 (2001) 
71 Id. 
  16
known as neighboring rights, concern other categories of owners of rights.72 Related 
rights differ from copyrights in that they belong to owners regarded as intermediaries in 
the production, recording, or diffusion of works.73 
 (ii) Patent: A patent is an exclusive right granted for an invention that is a product 
or a process providing a new way of doing something or offering a new technological 
solution to a problem.74 For patents the knowledge which is to be registered and thus 
made property must be (i) “new,” and thus not already in the public domain or the subject 
of a previous patent;75 (ii) “not obvious,” or not common sense to any accomplished 
practitioner in the field when asked to solve a particular practical problem (i.e. it should 
no be a self evident solution using available skills or technologies);76 and (iii) “useful, or 
applicable in industry.” The knowledge must have a stated function, a practical use and 
the ability to be immediately manufactured to fulfill this function.77 If all three conditions 
are met, then the knowledge can be patented, becoming intellectual property. 
 (iii) Trademarks: Traditionally, trademarks are understood to identify not only the 
origin of a product but also to provide a guarantee of reliability and quality. 78  With the 
increasing use of advertising and the growth of a consumer society, trademarks have 
gradually come to be understood as marks that aid consumer with products 
differentiation, evaluation of product quality, and brand identification.79 A trademark can 
                                                 
72 Id. at 256. (i.e. performers, the producers of phonograms, and broadcasting organizations). 
73 Id. at 257. 
74 MARGARET BARRET, INTELLECTUAL PORPERTY CASES MATERIALS, 189 (2ND EDITION). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Timothy W. Blakely, Beyond the International Harmonization of Trademark Law: The Community 
Trademark as a model of Unitary Transnational Trademark Protection, U. PA. L. REV. 309 (November 
2000). 
79 Id. 
  17
be made up of one or more distinctive words, letters, numbers, drawings or pictures, 
emblems or other graphic representations.80 In some jurisdictions the outward 
manifestation of packaging may also be allowed trademark status provided that it is not a 
form dictated by function (the most international famous case being the “Coca Cola 
bottle” in the United Kingdom).81 Trademarks need to be also registered at the local 
trademark office of each country or trade-community. 
 
                                                 
80 CHRISTOPHER MAY, supra note 49, at 9. 
81 GRAEME B. DINWOODIE et al, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, 308 (2001), 
(citing re Coca Cola Co.’s applications (1986) 2 All E.R. 274, 275-276 (U.K. H.L.). The Shape of the Coco 
Cola bottle has been registered as a trademark under the new U.K. Law implementing the EU Trademark 
Directive. See Registration No. 2,000,548 (Sept. 1, 1995).  
  18
 
 
CHAPTER III 
CREATING AND OBTAINING SECURITY INTEREST IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
IN ARGENTINA AND THE U.S. 
 
 Nowadays, there are many commercial transactions involving IP, in which it will 
be sold, purchased, licensed, joint ventured, carried from country to country by 
multinational companies, and used as collateral.82  
  Just as land was historically the principal measure of a business value, the 
industrial revolution made capital goods the principal measure of value.83 Now, as steel 
mills and factories decrease in value due to foreign competition, the centerpiece of the 
world economy has gradually become patents, copyrights and trademarks. This is the IP 
revolution.84   Mr. George Gilder argued that wealth is no longer derived from possessing 
physical resources. “Wealth and power came mainly to the possessor of material things or 
to the ruler of military forces capable of conquering the physical means of production; 
land, labor and capital… Today, the ascendant nations and corporations are masters not 
of land and material resources but of ideas and technologies.”85    
 There are at least three significant types of commercial transactions, particularly 
in the U.S. and Argentina, in which IP can play an important role: licensing: in contrast to 
                                                 
82 Gordon V. Smith, The importance of the Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets. Valuation 
Mechanisms, 1 (November 25, 1998) available at www.wipo.org  (last visited, March 23 2003). 
83  Lee G. Meyer et al, Intellectual Property in Today Financial Market, AM. BANKR INST. J. 20 (March 
2000). 
84 Id. 
85 GORDON V. SMITH & RUSSELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE 
ASSETS   229 (1989). 
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an assignment, which transfers all rights in the IP, an owner of IP can license some or all 
of its rights subject to specific limitations.86 IP licenses combine IP law and contract 
law;87 as mentioned in the introduction, in M&A, as the target assets; and in financing, as 
collateral supporting loans. Set forth below is a discussion of two different systems, 
American and Argentinean, to create and obtain a security interest in IP. 
 As mentioned above, the procedure to create and obtain security interest in IPRs 
is not new. In addition to Thomas Edison’s use of his incandescent electric light patent as 
collateral, Galileo Galilei also used a customary Italian law to obtain royalties on various 
optical devices that he invented and then permitted others to manufacture.88  
 Uncertainty and confusion have always accompanied the employment of IPRs as 
collateral. Lenders, seeking to minimize their exposure to risk, have historically been 
hesitant to lend money on the security of IP, instead preferring more traditional tangible 
collateral such as land, buildings and equipment.89  
 
A. METHOD OF PERFECTION UNDER THE U.S. SYSTEM 
 
 This section mainly discusses the intersection of U.S. federal and state law with 
respect to the creation of a security interest in IP. Copyrights, patents, and trademarks are 
                                                 
86 William J. Murphy, A Proposal for a Centralized an Integrated Registry for Security Interest in 
Intellectual Property, IDEA 662 (2002). Noting that a patent owner can license the right to make, use, and 
sell the patented invention or only the right to use the patent invention. A trademark owner can license 
another to use the mar in connection with the associated good and services. A copyright owner can license 
the right to make and distribute copies of the work, or the right to perform a play song. 
87 Id. 
88 Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges from the very Old 
and the very New, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 933 (2002).  
89 Shawn K. Baldwin, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: A Role for Federal Regulation 
of Intellectual Property as Collateral, U. PA. L. REV. 1701 (May 1995). 
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all subject of federal statutes, and all present federalism problems in the commercial law 
context.90 Since each area of IP has its own statutory and case law, each must be 
examined separately to determine the correct method for taking a valid and perfected 
security interest. In each case, the question is whether and to what extent federal law 
preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.91 
 As a prelude to addressing the copyright and patent federalism issues, it is worth 
noting that the constitutional basis for federal regulation of copyrights and patents, which 
grants to Congress the “power to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings Discoveries,”92 is not exclusive; state law may operate where 
Congress has not preempted it.93 Nevertheless, both patents and copyrights are now 
considered exclusively federal in nature.94 In trademarks the situation is different. 
Trademark may be governed by state law, although they may be registered under the 
federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, if they are used in interstate commerce.95 
                                                 
90 Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankrupcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of 
Securitization, CONN. L. REV 199, 202-03 (2000) (discussing common law and state statutes that governed 
pre-UCC secured transactions); See also Shubba Ghosh, The Morphing of Property Rules and Liability 
Rules: Intellectual Property Optimist Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 99, 110 (1997) (noting that article 9 of UCC is primary source of state law governing secured 
credit). 
91 U.S. CONST. Art. VI s2. The Supremacy Clause: “State Laws are invalid if they interfere with, or are 
contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution.” See also Cover v. Hydramatic 
Packing Co., 83 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir) cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3246 (1996) (Citing Gibbson v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1825)). 
92 See Alice Haemmerli, supra note 1, at 1653. (Citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973). 
The Clause of the Constitution granting to the Congress the power to issue copyright does not provide that 
such power shall vest exclusively in the Federal government. Nor does the Constitution expressly provide 
that such power shall not be exercised by the States.”). 
93 U.S. CONST. art I, s8, cl.8 
94 See Alice Haemmerli, supra note 1, at 1653 (noting that “under the new Copyright Act (effective January 
1, 1978), there is no more common law copyright. Patent Act has a long history  
95 LANHAM ACT § 1 states that “the owner of a trade-mark used in commerce may apply to register his or 
her trademark under this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1994) “Commerce is defined by the statute as all 
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).   
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 Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), different legal 
devices were created to make it possible for a creditor to look to specific property to 
satisfy a debt owed.96 For example, prior to the UCC, chattel mortgages, equipment 
trusts, conditional sales, and trust receipts were each governed by a separate set of rules 
and were limited in their application to only particular types of transactions.97  
 The original version of Article 9 of the UCC replaced the pre-UCC devices 
mentioned in the former paragraph.98 This article went through its first revision in 1972, 
and was most recently revised in 1999, with the changes becoming effective on July 1, 
2001.99 
 Generally, Article 9 governs transactions in which a debtor, in order to obtain a 
loan, uses his or her property as collateral for the debt. In this transaction, the creditor 
takes a "security interest" in the collateral that allows her to take the collateral in the 
event that the debtor defaults on the loan.100 Even if the debtor files for bankruptcy, a 
secured creditor under Article 9 will be guaranteed payment by taking the collateral.  
 Article 9 divides collateral into different categories such as goods, quasi-tangible 
property, and intangible property. It further subdivides goods into consumer goods, 
                                                 
96 UCC § 9-101 (1972) Stating that “[t]his Article sets out a comprehensive scheme for the registration of 
security interest in personal property and fixtures. It supersedes prior legislation dealing with such security 
devices as chattle mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factor’s liens and assignments of accounts 
receivable.”  See also In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc. 239 B.R. 917, 920 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (noting the 
[b]efore the adoption of the UCC, a variety of personal property security devices were used, including 
chattel mortgages, that placed title in the mortgagee). 
97 William A. Dornbos, Structuring, Financing, and Preserving Security Interest in Intellectual Property, 
BANKING L. J. VOLUME 113, NUMBER 7, 663 (1996).  
98 See UCC § 9-101 (1972) supra note 96 describing security devices replaced by Article 9 of UCC. 
99 UCC § 9-101 cmt. (2001) (explaining historical background of Article 9); See also Robert Scott, The 
Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 1783, 1784-87 (1994) (Discussing “connections between the 
institutional framework of the UCC and the substantive provisions of Article 9 that facilitated the 
development of such Article). 
100 UCC § 9-109 (a) (1) (2001) 
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equipment, farm product, and inventory.101 Quasi-tangible property is subdivided into 
instruments, investment property, documents, and chattel paper. Intangible property is 
subdivided into accounts, deposit accounts, general intangibles, health care receivables, 
and payment intangibles.102 The classification of collateral is important because, as 
mentioned below, Article 9 requires different technical steps to perfect103 security interest 
for different types of collateral.104 
 Regarding IPRs, Article 9 defined such rights as “any personal property” other 
than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments and money.105 Thus, IPRs 
fall in the category of general intangibles. 
 However, as mentioned, to take full advantage of the benefits of the UCC, Article 
9 requires that the creditor receiving the security interest "perfect" its security interest by 
filing a financing statement with the appropriate state government official106 or by taking 
                                                 
101 UCC § 9-102 cmt. 4a (2001) (listing the four mutually exclusive “types” of collateral that consist of 
goods: consumer goods, equipment, farm products, and inventory). 
102 UCC § 9-102 (2001) (providing definitions and classification of collateral) See also Xuan-Thao N. 
Nguyen, Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace: The Trouble with Perfection – Insecurity Interest in 
the New Corporate Asset, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37 (2002). 
103 Perfection is the process by which the creditor’s security interest becomes effective against other 
creditors, lien holders, and bankruptcy trustees. The most common means of perfecting a security interest is 
by filing a statement in the appropriate place, such as the office of the secretary state. See UCC § 9-310 
(2001), requiring that financing statement must be filed to perfect most security interest.  
104 UCC § 9-309 (2001), listing types of security interest that can be perfected by attachment; UCC § 9-310 
(2001), requiring filing of financing statement as most common method for perfecting security interest in 
majority of collateral property, but noting exceptions; UCC § 9-313 (2001), permitting secured party to 
perfect certain security interest by taking possession of collateral property; UCC § 9-314 (2001), providing 
perfection of security interest by control of investment property, deposit accounts, letter of credit rights, 
and electronic chattel paper.  
105 UCC § 9-102(a)(42) & cmt 5d. (2001) Intellectual property rights are included in this provision, 
according to the Official Comments of these articles that states: “copyrights, trademarks and patents” as 
an example of general intangibles. 
106 Id. § 9- 310 (2001) 
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some other designated perfection step. If the creditor does not file the appropriate 
financing statement, it interest will be violable in the event of the debtor bankruptcy.107  
 One limitation to the doctrine of perfection by filing is found in § 9-109(c) which 
states that filing is not required for perfection if “a statute, regulation, or treaty of the U.S. 
whose requirements for a security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien 
creditor with respect to the property preempt § 9-310(a).”108  
 This provision, coupled with the fact that federal laws govern copyrights, patents, 
and trademark raises the aforementioned question of whether security interest in IP is 
governed by Article 9, by federal law, or by some combination thereof. Unfortunately, 
Article 9 does not provide a clear resolution of this issue.109 
 A number of recent judicial decisions address the present issues and to some 
extent clarify them. 110 However, in order to obtain a better understanding of the methods 
of perfecting security interest in IPRs, we will explore, in detail, copyright, patent and 
trademark separately. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 Bankruptcy Code § 544 (a)  
108 UCC §§ 9-109 (c)(1); 9-311(a) 
109 See William A. Dornbos, supra note 97, at 664 
110 Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith Prods., Ltd. (In re AEG Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34, 
41 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (finding that a security interest in copyrights to films must be perfected through 
recordation of such security interest with the U.S. Copyright Office), aff'd, 161 B.R. 50 (9th Cir. 1993); 
National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Denver (In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.) 
116 B.R. 194, 199 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that perfection of security interests in copyrights is 
governed by federal registration rules, not the UCC); Creditors' Comm. of TR-3 Indus., Inc. v. Capital 
Bank (In re TR-3 Industries), 41 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) (finding that a security interest in 
trademarks must be perfected in accordance with Article 9 of the UCC, not the Lanham Act). 
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1. Copyright 
 This area does not present many problems in the theory but does so in the 
practice, because when lawyers have to follow all the different provisions, they may 
encounter some obstacles that complicate the creation of a security interest. 
 The Copyright Act presently contains the clearest structure regarding perfection 
of traditional security interest:111  
“Any assignment, mortgage, hypothecations,112 exclusive license 
or … other conveyance113 creating a present, future, or potential 
relationship between the parties is to be considered a transfer of 
copyright ownership114 that may be recorded in the Copyright 
Office.115 
 
 In view of the constructed definition, we can ascertain that security interest is 
clearly a form of hypothecation or pledge (with the same treatment as an assignment) that 
can be perfected only by recording at the U.S. Copyright Office.116 Moreover, it also 
makes clear that the recording provisions of the Copyright Act appear to satisfy the 
Article 9 of UCC.117 
 Unfortunately, when lawyers have to implement a security interest on a copyright, 
they will face a number of obstacles that came from the cold letter of the Copyright Act.  
                                                 
111 See Shawn K. Baldwin, supra note 89, at 1712 
112 See Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd. v. Capital Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990) 
113 17 USC § 101 (1998) 
114 17 CFR § 201.4(a)(2) (1998) 
115 17 USC § 205(a) (1998) 
116 See Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd, supra note 112 at 195. Noting that the Copyright Act provides for 
national registration and specifies a place of filing different from that specified in Article 9 filing of the 
security interest as set forth in UCC § 9-302(3)(a). 
117 Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith Prods., Ltd. (In re AEG Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34, 
41 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991). 
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 The first of these obstacles is that any document, filed with the Copyright Office, 
must identify the work to which it pertains.118 In other words, any creditor must file a 
security interest individually against each copyright. The situation becomes very 
complicate when lawyers are confronted by copyrights that require frequent changes or 
updates, such as software development project. Likewise, issues of practicality are raised 
when the debtor holds a very extensive inventory of copyright. 
 Under the Copyright Act, a lien can only attach to copyrights which are already 
registered.119 Thus, this statute a security interest cannot automatically attach to after-
acquired copyrights and, therefore, the lien on the copyright mortgage will not cover any 
copyright which is subsequently registered, even though representing a development 
stemming from the original registered copyright.  
 Therefore, the copyright in computer programs would have to be registered on an 
ongoing basis as each segment is completed in order to minimize the period during which 
the security interest is unperfected. This solution would not only be expensive, but it 
would also bury the Copyright Office with an avalanche of requests to register copyrights 
and record security interest in them. Additionally, creditors would be reluctant to provide 
financing if a certain number of their security interests were to remain vulnerable to 
attack because they must remain unperfected until the program is completed.120 
 This problem does not exist under the UCC, because security agreements and 
financing statements can take effect over “after acquired property.” Under this rule, a 
                                                 
118 17 USC § 205(c)(1) (1998) 
119 17 USC § 205 (1998) 
120 See William A. Dornbos, supra note 97, at 670. 
  26
perfected security interest in particular collateral automatically extends to after acquired 
property of the same sort if the parties have so agreed.121  
 As a preliminary conclusion, it is clear that Article 9 was not preempted by the 
Copyright Act as it relates to work in progress. Therefore, a prudent creditor who takes a 
security interest on a copyright (in progress) should register the copyright as soon as the 
work is completed, at which time the security agreement should be recorded in the 
Copyright Office. In the interim, a financing statement evidencing the security interest 
should be filed under the provisions of the UCC in the appropriate state office. 
Compliance with these procedures, although it is not mandatory, constitutes constructive 
notice to third parties of the contents of the recording document.122 
 Finally, regarding the priority of competing creditors, it is important to point out 
that the UCC employs the first-to-file rule to establish priority among creditors,123 
whereas the Copyright Act employs the “look-back” period during which a security 
interest filed first may lose its priority to a subsequently filed but previously executed 
security interest, so long as that second security interest is filed within one month after it 
was executed.124 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 Id. 
122 See William A. Dornbos, supra note 97 at 668. 
123 UCC § 9-312(5) (“Priority between conflicting securities interest in the same collateral shall be 
determined according to … priority in time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is 
first made covering the collateral or the time the security is first perfected, whichever is earlier …”) 
124 17 USC § 205(d) (1998) 
  27
2. Patent 
 Similar unclarity surrounds patents. Although, patent rights are granted and 
enforced solely under federal law, 125 the fact is that Patent Act contains recordation 
provision126 that seems to be a preemption of the UCC. However, there are many court 
decisions supporting the notion that state law governs the perfection of security interest in 
Patents.  
 The Patent Act provides that:  
“application for patent, patents, or any interest therein shall be 
assignable in law by an instrument in writing127 …an assignment, 
grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent 
purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without 
notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office 
within three months from its date or prior to the date of such 
subsequent purchase or mortgage.”128 
 
 The Official Comment to Section 9-104 of Article 9 takes the position that the 
Patent Act would not seem to contain sufficient provision regulating the rights of the 
parties and third parties to exclude security interest in patents from the provision of 
Article 9,129 but in regard to the recording provisions of the Patent Act, the Official 
Comment is of the view that those filing provisions are recognized as the equivalent to 
filing under Article 9. However, the Official Comment to Section 9-302(3) does not 
include the Patent Act among the examples given of federal statutes that establish a filing 
system that supersede that of Article 9.130 
                                                 
125 U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 cl. 8. 
126 However, these provisions do not specified the recordation of a security interest or “mortgage … or 
hypothecation” as in the Copyright Act. 
127 35 USC § 261 
128 Id. 
129 See William A. Dornbos, supra note 97, at 666. 
130 Id. 
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 These provisions raise the question whether filing under the Patent Act is 
sufficient to instrument a security interest that it is not in the form of and assignment.  
The profound uncertainty about how to instrument security interest on patents is reflected 
in following cases that arrived at different conclusions: 
 On one hand, some courts adhere to what seems to be the position that the 
recording provisions of the Patent Act do not supersede those of Article 9, which remain 
applicable.131 These courts ruled that because the trustee in bankruptcy is neither a 
purchaser nor a mortgagee, the filing of a security interest in a patent was properly 
perfected when the filing statement was recorded in the appropriate state office but not in 
the Patent Office.132 
 Reaching the opposite conclusion, the court in Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd. held 
that the conclusion mentioned in the former paragraph misconstrued the language of 
UCC § 9-104. The court concluded that when a federal statute provides for a national 
system of recordation or specifies a place of filing different from that in Article 9, the 
methods of perfection specified in said Article 9, are supplanted by that national 
system.133 The court also concluded that compliance with a national system of 
recordation is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under article 9 whether or 
not the federal statute also provides a priority scheme different from that in Article 9.134  
                                                 
131 Transportation Design & Technology Inc., 48 BR 635 (Bankr. SD Cal. 1985); City Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Otto Fabrics, Inc. 83 BR 780 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988), Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp. v. Sebro 
Packaging Corp 143 BR 360 (Bankr. D.Md. 1990), and Cybernetic Services Inc. 252 F3d 1039 (9 Circuit 
2001). 
132 See William A. Dornbos, supra note 97, at 666. 
133 See Pregrine Entertainment, Ltd, supra note 112 at 195. 
134 Id. 
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 It also important to point out that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) has, by regulation, created the possibility of federal recordation of security 
interest in patents.135 Section 3.56 of 37 C.F.R. provides that: 
Assignments which are made conditional on the performance of 
certain acts or events, such as the payment of money or other 
condition subsequent, if recorded in the Office, are regarded as 
absolute assignments for Office purposes until cancelled with 
written consent of all parties or by the decree of a court of 
competent jurisdiction. The Office does not determine whether 
such conditions have been fulfilled.136 
 In order to perfect a security interest in patents, a secured party must take what 
Professor Haemmerli has characterized as a “patchwork” approach.137 While a secured 
party may perfect a security interest against other creditors by following the UCC rules – 
filing a financing statement – one can obtain superior rights against subsequent 
titleholders only by adhering to the federal scheme – recording a patent mortgage in the 
USPTO.138  
 In the light of the foregoing, and also considering that pragmatism is an important 
value in commercial decision making, dual federal and state filing of patents is probably 
the most prudent practice in most instances.139  
 
 
 
                                                 
135 Jonathan C. Lipson, Financing Information Technologies: Fairness and Function, WIS. L. REV. 1115 
(2001). 
136 37 C.F.R. § 3.56 (2000)  
137 See Alice Haemmerli, supra note 1, at 1700. 
138 See Jonathan C. Lipson, supra note 135 at 1116. 
139 Paul J.N Roy et. al, Security Interest in Technology Assests and Related Intellectual Property: Practical 
and Legal Considerations, COMPUTER LAWYER 10 (1999). WL 16 No. 8 CLW 3 
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3. Trademark 
 Trademark can live forever and can be the most valuable asset a business owns.140 
From an economic point of view, a trademark is different from a patent or a copyright. A 
patent attaches solely to the underlying invention and a copyright covers only the 
underlying work. Trademarks, on the other hand may extend beyond a word or a design. 
 No longer the latest form of corporate assets,141 trademarks are highly valued,142 
and not surprisingly many, companies utilize them as collateral in commercial 
financing.143 
 A security interest in a trademark can be perfected by the filing of a financing 
statement under the UCC.144 However, considering not only the patent and copyright 
precedents but also the relatively uncharted legal history of security interest, filing under 
the state law may suffice for perfection, but most counsel will also file with the US Patent 
and Trademark Office.145  
 The Lanham Act contains recordation provisions.146 It provides only for filing of 
an assignment of trademark, which is not defined to include pledges, mortgages, or 
                                                 
140 See William A. Dornbos, supra note 97, at 659 
141 Lisa M. Vaccaro, Security Interest in Intellectual Property: Towards an Unifed System of Perfection, 
HOSFSTRA PROP. L.J. 215, 216 (1993). 
142 JULIUS R. LUNSFORD, JR. GOOD WILL IN TRADE MARKS: COCA COLA AND COKE, THE COCA COLA 
BOTTLER, 27 (1955). 
143 Russell L. Parr, The value of Trademark, C913 A,L.I.-A.B.A. 229, 235 (1994).  
144 Trimachi v. Together Dev. Corp., 255 BR 606, 611-12 (D. Mass 2000) 
145 One advantage of a federal filing is to put any purchaser of the business on notice of the prior security 
interest of the lender. See also Lee G. Meyer et al. Intellectual Property in Today’s Financing Market, 19 
MAR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20-21 (Mar. 2000). The perfect security trademark interest should be (1) 
filed into the PTO reciting the goodwill language described above, (2) filed as a UCC financing statement 
the appropriate jurisdiction reciting the elements of the business associated with the trademark, and (3) if 
they exist filed in compliance with any state trademark requirements’); See also Raymond T. Nimmer, An 
Update on Financing with Intellectual Property as a Collateral: PART I OF II, J. PROPRIETARY RTS. Oct 
1997, at 2, 10. Noting that a dual filing is the safest route for perfecting security interest in trademarks. 
146 Trademark are governed by both common law and Lanham Act. U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994). See also 
Judith L. Church, Intellectual Property Aspect of Corporate Acquisitions, SF14 ALI-ABA 323-336 (2000).  
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hypothecation of trademarks.147 It is also important to mention that Comment One to 
section 9-104 of the UCC does not mention the Lanham Act, yet does mention the 
Copyright and Patent Acts as federal statute that preempt the Code.148 Therefore, it is 
generally thought that the only method of perfecting a security interest in a trademark is 
to file a financing statement with the appropriate state office, pursuant to the UCC 
provisions.149 
 Judicial opinions remain relatively uniform in the perfection scheme for security 
interest in trademark.150 Courts have consistently held that the UCC governs such 
perfection.151 As mentioned the Lanham Act controls only the assignment of trademarks 
and not security interest in trademarks. 152 
                                                 
147 15 USC § 1060  states that: “a registered mark or a mark for which application to register has been filed 
shall be assignable with the goodwill of the business in which the mark is used ...."). 
148 Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat’l Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 946 & 
n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) The court held that “UCC commentary did not recognize Lanham Act filing 
provision as equivalent to filing provision of Article 9 of UCC.” 
149 Thomas S. Hemmendinger, Perfecting Security Interest in Intellectual Property, 35 R.I.B.J., Nov. 1986, 
at 8. 
150 In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo Co. 98 B.R. 778, 782 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); In re C.C. & Co., Inc., 86 
B.R. 485, 486-487 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat’l Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re 
Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 946 & n.3 (bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); Trimachi v. Together Dev. Corp., 
255 BR 606 (D. Mass 2000) 
151 Josepph v. 1200 Valencia Inc. (In re 199Z, Inc), 137 B.R. 778, 782 (Bnkr. C.D. Cal. 1992). The Court 
stated that “ruling that compliance with Article 9 of UCC, not Lanham Act under preemption theory, 
perfects security interests in trademarks); See also Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat’l Acceptance Co. of Am. (In 
re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 946 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1984) The Court stated that “The compliance 
with Article 9 of UCC perfected security interest in trademark collateral; See also Creditor’s Comm. of TR-
3 Indus., Inc. v Capital Bank (In re TR-3 Indus., Inc.) 41 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) The court 
hold that “Compliance with Article 9 of UCC perfected security interest in trademark). 
152 Trimacho v. Together Dev. Corp., 255 BR 606, 610-110 (D. Mass 2000). Concluding that recording of 
assignments required by Lanham Act does not include security interest.  In Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of America’s Hobby Center, Inc. v. Hudson United Bank (In re America’s Hobby 
Center, Inc.), 223 B.R. 275, 286 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998), the court stated that: 
“[n]one of the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, nor the 
New York Court of Appeals has spoken definitively on whether a security 
interest in a trademark is perfected only upon recording it with the 
trademark office, or whether a filing in accordance with the provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code… is adequate. Whereas the weight of such 
authority is more in line with a determination that the UCC would control, 
the matter is hardly free from doubt…. However, case law … clarify[ies] 
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 A practical issue that rises in this section is that trademark can only be assigned 
together with the goodwill.153 Assignments in gross are invalid. Therefore, any agreement 
granting a security interest in a trademark should expressly grant a security interest on 
those assets of the debtor that will enable the creditor to provide the goods or services 
that the public associates with the mark, enforceable on analogous terms. By taking this 
additional security interest, the creditor ensures that the consumer goodwill that has been 
built up in the mark will be assigned along with the mark itself in the event of default. 
 
4. Proposal for Reform 
 In recognition of the problems relating to perfection of security interest in IP, the 
Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the American Bar Association (ABA), 
established an Ad Hoc Committee on Security Interest (Committee)154 to study the 
problem and suggest possible solutions. The ABA’s Section of Business Law also 
followed by organizing a Task Force on Security Interest in IP (Task Force).155 Both the 
Committee and the Task Force agreed that the current state of the law was in need of 
revision.156 As a result of several meetings, the Committee adopted a series of resolutions 
                                                                                                                                                 
that for federal law to supersede the UCC “the federal satute itself must 
provide a method for perfecting the security interest.” 
153 Acme Valve & Fittings Co. v. Wayne, 386 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D. Tex. 1974) The Court hold that 
“In order for a transfer of rights un a trademark to constitute a sale or assignment, thereby vesting title to 
the trademark in a party the transfer must be absolute and must relate to the entire rights in the 
trademark.”); Li’l’ Red Barn, Inc. v. Red Barn Sys. Inc., 332 F. Supp. 98, 107 (ND. Ind. 1970) (“[T]he rule 
is well established that a mere agreement for the future assignment of a trademark is not and assignment of 
wither the mark itself or the goodwill attached to it.”). 
154 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Security Interests – Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section, 
Security Interest in IP: Current Law and Proposals for Reform, 1992 A.B.A. Sec. Bus. L. part. II. 
155 Members of the Task force included representation from the various Business Law Section committees 
relevant to the issues – Technology and Intellectual Property, Uniform Commercial Code and Commercial 
Financial Services. See Current Law and Proposals for Reform, 1992 A.B.A. Sex. Bus. L. part. I, at 4. 
156 See Lisa Vaccaro, supra note 141, at 219. 
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in the hope of clarifying and simplifying the federal and state law.157 Subsequently, the 
Task Force submitted its proposal to change the American current system of laws 
regarding security interest (the Proposal).158  
 The Task Force Proposal was intended to provide uniformity in the system of 
perfecting liens on IP. The Proposal also sought to define an approach to resolving the 
uncertainties in the current law.159 In 1992, the Joint ABA Task Force on Security 
Interest in IP published its Preliminary Report.160 Specifically, the Task Force considered 
the type of property that should be protected, the process and place of filing the 
prioritization of such filings, and the determination of what constitutes adequate notice of 
a security interest.161  The Task Force proposal adopts a “mixed perfection approach” 
which would coordinate federal and state filings.162 Under this mixed approach, a lender 
is required to file a UCC financing statement against its borrower in accordance with all 
applicable provisions of Article 9 in the state or states where such property may be held 
or used by the debtor. 163 In addition, it requires that a notice filing be filed at the federal 
level in the appropriate office according to the name of the debtor. This new system is 
designed to establish priority over subsequent transferees or assignees. The state filing 
                                                 
157 Those resolutions related to the recordation of security interest, recommending that (i) a mixed approach 
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would create priority against lien creditors, secured creditors and all third parties other 
than subsequent purchaser for value, against whom the federal filing would be required to 
establish priority. The federal filing would evidence the lender’s interest in the federally 
registered IP, thereby creating a system of prioritizing security interest in the USPTO and 
Copyright Office, as applicable.164 Thus, even thought the apparent advantage of the 
proposal is that perfection is made by UCC filing, there is still a lack of clarity, because 
in order to prefect a security interest a dual filing is required. 
 The Committee of the Task Force set out to draft separate proposed amendments 
to the Copyright Act,165 The Patent Act,166 The Lanham Act,167 and the Semiconductor 
Chip.168 Although the four drafts were formed around the existing language and concepts 
in the four separate pieces of legislation, they had many common elements. 
 As on March 1, 1999, the Task Force had consolidated the common elements of 
its four earlier drafts into one draft statute, the Federal Intellectual Property Security Act 
                                                 
164 Id. 
165 Thomas M. Ward, The Perfection and Priority Rules for Security Interest in Copyrights, Patents, 
Trademarks,: The Current Structural Dissonance and Proposed Legislative Cures, ME L. REV., 451 (2001) 
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(FIPSA).169 FIPSA represent a shorter and more streamlined piece of legislation. This 
section analyzes the principal provision of such a proposal. 
 
(i) Priority Among Holders of Security Interest - The Elimination or Drastic 
Reduction of the Tract Recording Grace Periods 
 As mentioned before, the determination of priority between competing claims 
currently varies with respect to application of UCC and the federal statutes.  The UCC 
employ the first-to-file rule to establish priority among creditors.170 The Copyright Act 
employs the “look-back” period during which a security interest filed first may lose its 
priority to a subsequently filed but previously executed security interest, so long as that 
second security interest is filed within one month after it was executed.171 The Patent Act 
provides that “any assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any 
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee … unless it is recorded in the USPTO within three 
months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.”172 
The Lanham Act grants a similar three month related-back period during which an 
assignee can perfect its security interest to the exclusion of subsequent parties who may 
be unaware of the pre-existing lien.  
 FIPSA, realizing that this difference in application of priority between state and 
the federal perfection statutes creates problems, assumes that the various “look-back” 
periods found in federal statutes will be reduced and, in the near future eliminated.   
                                                 
169 Task Force on Security Interest in Intellectual Property, Business Law Section, American Bar 
Association, Draft, Federal Intellectual Property Security Act (March 1999). THOMAS M. WARD. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE §§ 2:14-2:44 (Rev. ed. 2001). 
170 See UCC § 9-312(5) supra note 123. 
171 See 17 USC § 205(d) (1998) supra note 124  
172 See 35 USC § 261 supra note 127 
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 FIPSA proposes the elimination of the one or two month grace period regarding 
priority in section 205(d) of the Copyright Act. In its place FIPSA creates a race-notice 
rule that gives priority to the first “executed” transfer of copyright ownership if recorded 
in a manner to give constructive notice “before recordation in such manner of the later 
transfer.”173 Otherwise, the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner and if 
taken in good faith, for value, and without notice of the earlier transfer.174 
 In relation to trademarks, FIPSA proposes the amendment of section 1060 of the 
Lanham Act, replacing the three-month period for trademark recording with a straight 
notice recording priority rule.175  
 FIPSA also propose the amendment of section 261 of the Patent Act, retaining a 
grace period for recoding a prior assignment, grant or conveyance.176 However, the 
proposed language reduces the time period from three months to then days.177 
 
(ii) Recording and Priority Rules 
 After dispensing with the federal recording grace periods, FIPSA removes 
security interest from the operation of the Copyright Act tract recording provisions178 and 
adds a new section 205(f). 
 A subtle change in the proposed section 205(d) language is the substitution of the 
phrase “transfer of copyright ownership” for “transfer” in describing the conflict that fall 
                                                 
173 See Thomas M. Ward, supra  note 165 at 452 (Citing Task Force Draft -  Federal Intellectual Property 
Security Act § 4(a)(2)).  
174 Id. 
175 Id. (Citing Task Force Draft - Federal Intellectual Property Security Act § 4(b)). 
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within the tract priority rule in this section.179 As Professor Ward said, “the change in 
language is significant because FIPSA also redefines a ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ 
in Section 101 so as to exclude the Article 9 security interest and its prior common law 
precursors.”180 By inserting this new definition in the scope of the center that introduces 
the 205(d) priority rule, the FIPSA language has undercut one of the holdings in 
Peregrine181 to the effect that security interest could be a transfer of “copyright 
ownership” within the federal priority rule in section 205(b).  
 FPSA also adds a new subsection 205(f)182 that excludes all issues concerning the 
creation, perfection, priority or enforcement of a security interest in copyright collateral 
from the operation of the Section 205 recording and priority rules, including the 
subsection (e) priority rule on nonexclusive licensees. This new subsection makes clear 
that recording a security interest in the section 205 tract file will not give constructive 
notice of any fact relating to the existence or priority of any security interest. 183 
 FIPSA proposes to amend section 261 of the Patent Act by providing that “the 
rights and obligations of all persons with respect to a security interest in a patent, patent 
application or the process of either, including matters of creation, attachment, perfection, 
priority, and enforcement, shall be governed by non-federal law relating to security 
interest in personal property.”184 
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 The amendment suggested for the Lanham Act does not completely exclude 
security interests from the tract recording priority rule.185 Instead, Section 1060 provides 
that the assignee of a mark is subject to the right of any secured party who has filed a 
federal financing statement prior to the date of filing of such assignment.186 Under the 
FIPSA Proposal for Section 1060, a secured party’s priority against a competing 
assignment expressly depends, not on purchasing prior to the recording of the assignment 
or on state law priority, but on the secured party winning the race to the federal file.187 
 This specific inclusion of security interests within the recording priority provision 
of Section 1060 means that FIPSA actually contains a different federal “race” priority 
rule for federal marks than it does for copyrights and patents. 
 
(iii) New Federal Recording System  
 FIPSA in Section 3(b) sets out the mechanical requirements for a federal 
financing statement and the structure for a federal notice filing system to handle 
financing statements covering Federal IPRs.188 This section establishes a set of 
instructions to each federal agency to coordinate their respective procedures for filings of 
federal financing statements as to security interest in Federal IPRs.189 Despite this 
impressive new structure created by FIPSA, however, federal notice filing for security 
interest functions only in a very narrow perfection and priority corridor.190 
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 Section 3(b)(2)(A) contains a broad congressional deferral to state law on all 
matters concerning the creation, perfection, and priority of a security interest in federal 
IPRs.191 On the other hand, Section 3(b)(2)(B) contains a very narrow exception from this 
general reference to Article 9 for priority disputes between secured parties and transferees 
192of Federal IPRs. We agree with professor Ward, who, while explaining this section, 
argued that: “this singular federal ‘race’ rule renders a security interest in a Federal 
Intellectual Property Right ‘ineffective’ against transferee of such a right whenever the 
transferee records in the appropriate federal tract file before the secure party files on of 
the newly-conceived federal financing statements in the newly-conceived federal notice 
file under the name of the debtor.193  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
191 See Task Force Draft - Federal Intellectual Property Security Act supra note 169 § 3(b)(2)(A) “The 
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(iv) A Discrete “Race” Priority Rule Governs Conflicts Between Security Interest in 
“Federal Intellectual Property Rights and Transferees194 of These Rights 
 The new federal financing statement created by FIPSA is at the core of the only 
federal priority in this proposal. The Section 3(b)(2)(B) race priority rule is designed to 
handle conflict between secured parties and transferees.195 A security interest is made 
“ineffective” against a transferee who records the document transferring ownership 
before the secured party files an effective federal financing statement.  Note that 
“ineffectiveness” of a security interest in a federal intellectual property right that results 
from losing this federal race is not made applicable to the “proceeds” of the security 
interest in such right.196 The language of FIPSA refers all disputes involving priority in 
“proceeds” to applicable non-federal law.197 
 
(v) Treatment of After-Acquired Property and Proceeds 
 FIPSA also assumes that secured parties will be given, in the federal offices, the 
ability to file a security interest in “after acquired property” and proceeds. Although the 
Proposal does not specifically address how this assumption will be turned into reality, it 
                                                 
194 In FIPSA, “transferees” are defined as those who acquire any right or interest in, or ownership of, a 
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most likely would flow directly from allowing a filing of the UCC filing statement in the 
appropriate federal office.198 
 
(vi) Creation of a Single Data Base 
 FIPSA includes the creation of the separate federally managed database called 
Federal Intellectual Property Data Center, and also a uniform form federal financing 
statement covering copyright, patent and trademarks.  A single (either federal or 
integrated multistate) national database for security interest in IP is very compelling.199  
 This single federal file would be accessible to the states so as to allow financing 
statements to be filed or referred to in the database.200 Although this model requires the 
creation a duplicate federal filing apparatus, it would preserve the basic integrity of the 
carefully crafted state law based Article 9 perfection and priority scheme. 
 The integrated national file need not be “federal,” however, if the current state 
financing statement indexes could be electronically combined in one national meta-site. 
Then, all financing statements covering “general intangibles” could be accessed by key 
strokes or clicks from within the federal title records for copyrights patens and 
trademarks.201  
 Although this proposal will probably be subjected to further reforms, it is a 
valuable step toward a unified system of perfection, which could reduce waste and 
excessive cost, which unfortunately remain the main characteristic of using IP as 
collateral. FIPSA will clearly be advantageous to commercial lenders as providing 
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lenders with uniform and reliable access to information assures them that their own 
filings will adequately notify subsequence parties of their security interest in a borrower’s 
IP. 
 
B.  METHOD OF PERFECTION UNDER THE ARGENTINE SYSTEM 
 
 For quite some time, restrictions on business and investment in Argentina made 
the role of IP in security a secondary issue. Notwithstanding, there had long been a body 
of opinion making enforceable charges or liens on registered IP based in part on the Law 
for Registered Pledges.202 
 In the early 1990s, Argentina began to undergo large-scale economic 
privatization. This process introduced several economic reforms designated to combat the 
inflation and to reduce the federal deficit. It liberalized the economy, and, of course, 
privatized the major public companies, such as YPF (Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales) 
and Obras Sanitarias de la Nacion, among others. Also among the steps taken to liberalize 
trade was Argentina’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), along with 
the subordinate obligation to amend its IP laws in compliance with the minimum standard 
set forth in the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).203  The economic reforms and the diversification of transaction financing have 
had a strong impact on the value of commercial asset, including that of IP. 
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 It is important to point out that in the Argentinean legal lexicon, the terms 
“security interests” and “secured credits” do no exist. Instead, two types of guaranty 
(garantia) are distinguished, namely personal and real.204 Personal guaranty is referred to 
as such because it does not create a real right above any identified assets of the principal 
debtor. Instead, it gives the creditor a second person to look to for payment if the 
principal debtor fails to pay as promised.205 In contrast, real guaranties create a real right 
above assets owned by the debtor.206 Within this classification are mortgage or 
“Hipoteca,”207 which creates collateral on immovable assets (real state), and the pledge 
or “Prenda,”208 which creates collateral on movable assets.  
 This section will analyze how to constitute security interest on IP in Argentina. It 
will specifically focus on the Law of Registered Pledges, which, unlike under the U.S. 
system, is applicable to all IPRs and does not preempt copyright, patent and trademark 
Law. 
 
1. The Protection of Intellectual Property Law in Argentina 
 Before delving into the method for perfecting a pledge under the Civil and 
Commercial Law in Argentina scenario, it is necessary to briefly explain the treatment of 
IP protection in Argentina. The Argentine Constitution states that: 
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“…every author or inventor is exclusive owner of his work, 
invention or discovery for the period established by law.”209 
 
 Rules governing copyrights are established by Law 11,723.210 The rights granted 
by the law pertain to the author for life and to his/her heirs and assignees for 50 years 
after his/her death.211 For photographic works, the copyright period runs for 20 years 
from first publication and for films, 30 years.212 The copyright on anonymous works by 
institutes, corporations, or other legal entities lasts for 50 years from the date of their first 
publication.213 The Copyright Law also grants protection to unpublished works.214 This 
kind of protection is granted for 3 years and can be renewed indefinitely while the work 
has not been published. Copyrights can be transferred by written assignment.215 All 
assignments, including licenses, must be recorded at the "Registro Nacional del Derecho 
de Autor" (the National Copyright Register or "NCR").216 Assignments do not require 
consideration.  
 Article 13 of the Copyright Law provides protection for foreign works as long as 
all requirements for protection have been complied with in the country of origin. In order 
to be granted protection in Argentina, it must be shown that the author of the work is a 
citizen of a country which protects intellectual works and that such author has fulfilled all 
necessary requirements to be granted protection in the country in which the publication 
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took place must be submitted.217 Protection is granted as from the date of the first 
publication. Alternatively, if the country of the author does not grant protection, the Bern 
Convention might still apply.  
 The registration of foreign works in Argentina is not mandatory in order to enjoy 
copyright protection. Notwithstanding this, local registration is advisable in order to open 
a file with the NCR in which transfers related to such rights may be recorded and in order 
to enjoy tax benefits. Also, it may be necessary to include said rights under any security 
agreement.  
 Trademark Law 22,362218 governs matters related to trademarks. The law 
provides that the ownership of a trademark and the right to its exclusive use are obtained 
only by registration with the Registry of Trademarks.219 Accordingly, registration, and 
not use, confers proprietary rights. The duration is 10 years, renewable indefinitely for 
periods of ten years if the trademark has been used within five years prior to each renewal 
and the use was made to market products, render services, or as a trade name.220 Failure 
to use the trademark for an uninterrupted period of five years makes it subject to 
cancellation.221 
 A new Patent Law 24,572222 governs matters related to patents.223 The most 
relevant provisions of the new law are: (i) Patents are granted for a 20 years period as 
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from the filing date of the application;224 (ii) Pharmaceutical products’ inventions shall be 
patentable;225 (iii) Compulsory licenses may be requested under similar conditions as 
those provided by the Paris Convention;226 (iv) Utility models are now regulated by law; 
and (v) The Patent Law has to be interpreted within the principles of GATT/TRIPS, 
because Articles 31 and 75.22 of the National Constitution, as well as art. 27 of the 
Vienna Convention are interpreted to mean that international treaties prevail over 
national laws in case of conflict between their provisions.  
 
2. Pledge under the Argentinean Civil and Commercial Law 
 Argentina follows the civil law tradition of Spain, France and Italy.227 Congress 
has the power to enact Codes in all areas including civil, commercial, and criminal 
matters. The extensive set of codes are enforceable nationwide and therefore subject to 
the interpretation and jurisdiction of both federal and state or provincial courts. The Civil 
Code specifically recognizes as formal sources of law “statutory law and its interpretation 
by analogy, customs under limited circumstances, and even general principles as 
expounded by legal doctrine.”228 As mentioned in Section I of the present study and, 
considering that one of principal sources of the Argentinean law is Roman Law, the Civil 
Code embodies two main categories of goods: immovable thing or real estate (goods that 
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may no be moved) and movable thing or chattel (goods that may be moved). Collateral 
may be created only in movable goods, but not in real estate (i.e. mortgages).229 
 Given these provisions of the Argentinean Civil Law, IP is not a tangible thing,230 
but that it is considered as a registrable immaterial asset according to the definition of 
goods given by article 2312 of the Civil Code.231 Because IP cannot be physically 
delivered, or be considered a tangible asset, it should be kept in mind that special 
privileges such as pledges, must be strictly construed. 
 Both civil and commercial pledges regulated by the Civil and Commercial Codes 
are defined as “the pledge which may be constituted when the debtor or a third person in 
his name, on the basis of a present or conditional obligation, hands over to the creditor a 
movable thing or asset or a credit in guarantee of a debt.”232  
 The main difference between a civil and commercial pledge is that in the 
commercial pledge, the creditor is entitled to a private sale (i.e., an out-of-court 
foreclosure). The Commercial Code states that unless the debtor and the creditor agree 
upon a special sale proceeding, the pledged asset must be sold by public auction, duly 
announced in the Official Gazette, ten days before such auction takes place.233 
 Although the trademark or patent certificate issued by the local Trademark and 
Patent Office is a thing or chattel in itself and could be pledged, the immaterial nature of 
                                                 
229 See Sergio M. Ellmann, supra note 202, at 216. 
230 CIVIL CODE Art. 2311 states that “Material objects which are capable of having value are called 
chattels.” 
231 CIVIL CODE Art. 2312 states that “Immaterial objects which are capable of having value, as well as 
chattels, are called assets.” 
232 COMMERCIAL CODE Arts. 580-588; Civil Code Art. 3204. 
233 See Sergio M. Ellmann, supra note 202, at 216 
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IPRs does not fit the sort of tangible thing that may be pledged based on civil or 
commercial law.234 
 The Argentine system has imposed great burdens on both creditor and debtor. The 
formalities required to prefect a pledge were almost impossible to achieve. The long time 
it took to obtain the legal protection, the inability of the debtor to develop business, and 
the diminution in value of the merchandise were just some of the obstacles that 
characterized the Argentinean system. The civil and commercial pledge had not provided 
a workable or acceptable system for the business community.  
 
3. Registered Pledges 
 In 1946, the government issued the Decree-Law 15.848/46,235 which provided for 
the creation of pledges where the asset pledged may remain in the possession of the 
pledgor (“Law for Registered Pledges”).236 
 The Law for Registered Pledges establishes two types of pledges: the fixed pledge 
over specific goods and the floating pledge over merchandise and raw material of a 
commercial or industrial establishment, which allows the debtor to sell such goods 
according to the business which is part of its commercial undertaking, and also to include 
future goods that do not presently exist.237 
 Article 10 of the Law for Registered Pledges states:  
“…all valuable things or chattels or assets may be object of a 
pledge.” 238 
                                                 
234 Id. 
235  Decree Law 15.848/46, ratified by Law 12.962 and as further amended by Decree 897/95. 
236 See Sergio M. Ellmann, supra note 202, at 217 
237 Id. 
238 See Decree Law 15.848/46 supra note 235 at Art. 10. 
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 This would include the production of those goods which have not yet been 
collected, such us goodwill, future things, and industrial property.239  
 But it was not until the amendment of the Law for Registered Pledges, by Decree-
Law 897/95, that for the first time it addressed the possibility of perfecting a pledge on 
IPRs. Article 11 of such law states that:  
“all movable or semi movables asset may be pledged and that a 
pledge of the goodwill of an enterprise (Fondo de Comercio) 
would not include the merchandise thereof, but would include 
installations, rental agreements on the location of the commercial 
enterprise, trademarks, patents, designs and industrial models.”240  
 
 Note that the definition above allows different kind of obligations to be the 
subject of a pledge. Indeed, obligations that do not yet even exist, but which may latter 
come into existence, may also be secured.241 
 Unlike under American Law, the Argentinean system does not present a conflict 
of interest between Federal and State law with respect to the creation of a security interest 
in IP. To make a pledge effective it is necessary to register it with the Registro de 
Creditos Prendarios de la Nacion (“RCPN” or “Registry of Pledges”).242 This will then 
be forwarded to the Patent and Trademark Office (INPI) or Copyright Office (DNDA) for 
recordation against each and every trademark, patent or copyright application or 
registration included in the security agreement.243 The registration is effective vis-à-vis 
third parties (constructive notice) as from the date of filing before the RCPN, or as from 
                                                 
239  See Sergio M Ellmann, supra note 202, at 217 
240 See Decree 897/95 supra note 235 at  Art 11. 
241 See Sergio M Ellmann, supra note 202, at 217 
242 See Decree-Law 897/95 supra note 235 at Art. 17 states that “Recordal of security agreements will be 
effected at the registrar for pledges, which shall function in the national, provincial or municipal offices, 
which will be determined by the Executive Power in accordance with regulations which such power will 
determine, procedures before the registrar pledges will be subject to a fee fixed by the Executive Power  
243 As an additional safeguard and considering a eventual delay by the RCPN a separate brief, just for 
information purposes, should filed at the INPI or DNDA in respect of each trademark, patent or copyright. 
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the time the agreement is signed if recordation is effected within twenty four (24) hours 
of execution.244  
 The term of the pledge registration is five years from the date of the 
recordation.245 It can be renewed for an equal term, so long as the originating security 
agreement has not been canceled, on request by the creditor addressed to the Registrar 
before the expiration of the pledge.246 The registration term is not interrupted by the 
initiation of foreclosure procedures or by decisions handed down by the court; therefore, 
renewal must still be requested within the five-year term.247 If a foreclosure procedure is 
initiated before the end of the term, the plaintiff may have the court order renewal for the 
subsequent five years, or as long as it deems necessary.248 If, for any reason, the term 
expires and registration is not renewed, the creditor loses the right to summary 
foreclosure proceedings.249 
 Registered pledges do not require a public deed. They should be established 
through an authenticated private instrument, using the forms provided by the RCPN. This 
form must be filed in Spanish, signed by duly authorized officers of each of the parties, 
with signatures attested to by a Notary Public. Together with this form, the full security 
agreement may be filed to the extent that its stipulations are enforceable under Argentine 
law. It is generally not convenient to file the full Security Agreement. For instance, it 
                                                 
 See Sergio M Ellmann, supra note 202, at 218 
244 See Decree-Law 897/95 supra note 235 at Art. 19 states that “within the 24 hours of having received the 
agreement for recordal, the Registrar will record the agreement and communicate in a similar term by 
certified letter to the privileged creditors referred to in article 11 sub-paragraph e; the agreement must 
specified those liens that may already exist upon creation of the pledge.” 
245 Id at Art. 23 
246
247 Id. (citing Commercial Court in City of La Plata, Chamber II, February, 23 1978 (Digesto Juridico 1979 
Vol. 2, p. 37). 
248 See Decree 897/95, supra note 235 Art. 23. 
249 Id. (citing National Commercial Court, Chamber “D” Oct. 30, 1992 in re: “Banco de Italia y Rio de La 
Plata S.A. v. Castro Alvarez Julio (La Ley, 1994-Vol. “A” p. 475). 
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may not be advisable to file the full security agreement if: (i) some of the clauses could 
be considered null and void according to the Argentine Law or (ii) it is only intended to 
secure a part of the credit with the industrial property registered in Argentina or (iii) the 
Security Agreement contains confidential information which the client does not want to 
be made public. 
 Article 2 of Decree 897/95 instructs the Direccion the Technologia Calidad y 
Propiedad Industrial (presently replaced by INPI) to: 
“…to record pledge agreements created in trademarks, patents 
ensigns, industrial drawings and models, honorary distinctions 
and all rights of commercial industrial or artistic nature.” 
  
 Although the purpose of this article is clear, it lacks the desired precision. First, 
INPI is simply not able to record pledges over assets that are not registered before its 
office. The only rights against which pledges may therefore be recorded are trademarks, 
patents, utility models, industrial models and designs. The article cites “rights” which are 
at best of ambiguous and undefined nature (such as ensigns, industrial drawings, or 
honorary distinctions), as well as doubtful commercial value.250  
 It is important to note that after the amendment of 1995, any party may be secured 
with pledge over goods or assets in accordance with Article 1229 and 1331 of the Civil 
Code, but does not necessarily need to be the actual debtor. In other words, the pledgor 
may stand as a third party to the creditor and the debtor by securing the debtor’s loan if 
the pledgor is the owner of the secured goods.251 
 
 
                                                 
250 Id. 
251 COMMERCIAL COURT, CHAMBER B, November 24, 1980 – JA Vol. X p. 10. 
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C. ENFORCING SECURITY INTEREST 
 In these kinds of business transactions, enforcement becomes one of the most 
important issues. Sometimes, slow and costly procedures deteriorate the real purpose of 
this legal device. Moreover, if we consider that the assets involved are IPRs in which the 
value depends on their maintenance and protection, speed in enforcement is a key feature 
to induce creditors to rely on intellectual property collateral.252 
 Under the American system, since there are no federal laws governing the 
foreclosure of security interest, such proceedings are governed by state law.  State law 
varies concerning the proper procedure for foreclosure. Some states, rather than 
permitting conventional foreclosure proceedings, require a creditor’s bill in equity (i.e. an 
action to compel assignment) with respect to incorporeal property such as IP. 253  Other 
states do, however, allow traditional foreclosure proceedings concerning IP. Therefore, it 
is advisable to check the laws of the jurisdiction in question. 
 Article 9 of the UCC provides the rights and remedies of the creditor and 
debtor.254 In some cases the security agreement can supplement or vary said rights.255 
Article 9 does not define default. However, as Professors McDonnell and Moglia Claps 
stated, while arguing on difference enforcement on secured credit in Argentina and the 
United States, it provides for flexible and rapid enforcement of non-possessory security 
interest in case of non payment. Upon default the creditors have the power to control all 
the IPRs involved and may simply apply them to their debts.256 The creditor is also 
                                                 
252 See Guillermo A. Moglia Claps and Julian B. McDonnell, supra note 204 at 418. 
253 Thomas L. Bahrick, Security Interest in Intellectual Property, AIPLA QUARTERLY J. 48 (1987) 
254 UCC § 9-501 (3) 
255 Id. 
256 USC § 9-607 (2001). 
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entitled to take possession of tangible collateral, and may do so either by judicial process 
or by self help, provided it does not commit a breach of the peace.257 These procedures 
allow the secured creditor to liquidate the collateral much more rapidly.258 
 Once the creditor is in possession of all the IPRs, he is entitled to conduct the sale 
or other disposition. Such processes can be arranged privately or may be by auction 
conducted by creditor.259 Given that the disposition is forced, the sale is not required to 
yield fair market value.260 Another provision is “the acceleration clause” that provides 
under certain circumstances that the creditor may accelerate the maturity of the debt and 
cause all payment to become immediately due and payable.261 A variation of on the 
acceleration clause is an insecurity clause that provides that the creditor may accelerate 
the maturity of the entire debt whenever the creditor deems itself insecure.262  
 Article 9 rules, on disposition process, are very broad, and therefore give the court 
a good deal of discretion in policing the disposition process.263 If the disposition fails to 
produce net proceeds sufficient to cover the secured debt, the debtor remains personally 
liable for the defiency. Although case law has not established precisely what is called for 
in the sale of intellectual property in order to satisfy the UCC, a good discussion of 
general factors to be considered in the sale of unique items can be found in In re Four 
Star Music Co. 264 In summary, this case involved a sale of a copyrighted music catalog 
                                                 
257 See Guillermo A. Moglia Claps and Julian B. McDonnell, supra note 204 at 418 
258 Id. (Citing LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 48 
(2000) (secured creditor able to obtain possession within 2 or three weeks). 
259 Id. (citing UCC § 9-610(c) (2000)). 
260 Id. (citing UCC § 9627 (2001)). 
261 See William A. Dornbos, supra note 97, at 683 
262 Id. 
263 See Guillermo A. Moglia Claps and Julian B. McDonnell, supra note 204 at 419 
264 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 343 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn 1979). 
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that was held not to have been carried out pursuant to commercially reasonable practices 
based upon the creditor’s failure to seek specialized advice, obtain competent appraisal, 
and make attempts to reach logical purchasers.  
 The Argentine Law establishes a foreclosure procedure.265 Claims should be filed, 
at the option of the creditor, in the jurisdiction where the payment was agreed, where the 
goods are located, or where the debtor is domiciled.266  Once the complaint with an 
attachment of the pledged goods or assets is affected, such complaint will be notified to 
the registrar for pledges and the corresponding offices where the pledge has been 
noted.267 This procedure also confirms the necessity of recordation which was explained 
above. 
 The summary foreclosure procedures only allow limited defense by the debtor, 
and should result in the Court ordering public auction of the relevant goods or assets.268 
After the amendment of 1995, the state, certain decentralized institutions, banks, financial 
institutions authorized to do banking in Argentina or international financial institutions 
are able to order the seizure of the corresponding goods or assets to be sold in private 
auction. The procedure for private auction is regulated by Article 585 of the Commercial 
Code.269 Any other way in which the creditor gets possession of the goods or assets 
                                                 
265 Decree Law 15.348/46 Arts. 26 to 29. Noting that the pledge certificate grants foreclosure procedure to 
realize the credit, interest, expenses and court costs. The foreclosure procedure and the sale of the assets 
shall benefit from short, verbal cummary proceedings. Once the complaint has been filed with the 
certificate, the court shall order attachment and auction of assets as in executory proceedings  
266 Id. Art. 28. (Note that in the practice the RCPN do not admit pledges in which if the creditor and the 
debtor are domiciled abroad). 
267 See Sergio M Ellmann, supra note 202, at 220 
268 Id. 
269 COMMERCIAL CODE Art. 585 of the: “If the debt remains unpaid after the established term, and if there is 
no special sale agreed upon by the parties, the creditor may proceed to sell the pledged goods or assets, in 
auction, which must be previously announced with a 10-day notice. 
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which is against Law 12.962 or Article 585 will be null and void, and could even incur 
criminal sanctions.270 
 Finally, Argentina presents a particular scenario regarding the foreclosure 
procedure. Under the 1994 reform of the Argentine Constitution, international 
agreements have acquired preeminence over local law.271 Among such international 
agreements is the “Pacto de San Jose de Costa Rica,”272 which could be considered to 
conflict with the special foreclosure procedure given to the state and other institutions 
according to Article 39 of the Law of the Pledges and Article 585 of the Commercial 
Code. Article 8 of this international agreement establishes that all persons have a right to 
be heard, with due guarantees, within a reasonable term by a judge or component court, 
independent and impartial, which has been established before the law. The private 
foreclosure procedure created exclusively for certain financial institutions could be 
conceivably being held to contravene this article. Under the same reasoning, the special 
foreclosure procedure could also be considered to violate Article 18 of the Argentine 
Constitution, which contains a similar guarantee of due process. 
 Of course, that analysis is far from the real meaning of the spirit of the 
Commercial Law and the Law of the Pledge. However, under certain circumstances the 
way of thinking could be applicable, especially in cases where the delivery of the pledged 
assets to the creditor for a private auction may be unconscionable if it generates unjust 
                                                 
270 Id. 
271 ARG. CONST. ART. 75, § 22, states that: “to approve or reject treaties concluded with other nations and 
international organizations, and concordats with the Holy See. Treaties and concordats have a higher 
hierarchy than laws. … In order to attain constitutional hierarchy, the other treaties and conventions on 
human rights shall require the vote of two-thirds of all the members of each House, after their approval by 
Congress 
272 See Convencion Americana Sobre Derechos Humanos "Pacto De San Jose De Costa Rica" November 
22, 1969 available at  www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/firmas/b-32.html, last visited June 1, 2003. 
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enrichment (i.e. the value of pledge assets largely exceeds outstanding debt) and perhaps 
may be attacked on that basis. It also seems farfetched that an international agreement 
originally conceived to protect human rights and guarantee minimum standards of justice 
could be construed to apply to commercial contractual relationships.273 Moreover, local 
court decisions consistently have upheld the procedure and even characterized it as 
beneficial to both parties.274 
 
 
                                                 
273 See Sergio M. Ellmann, supra note 202 at 221 
274 Banco de la Nación Argentina v. Telan S.A., Civil and Comercial Federal court, Chamber II, Aug. 14, 
1979. The court held that the seizure authorized by Article 39 of Decree law 15.34/46, Law 12.962, which 
does not imply formal filing of foreclosure proceedings, is in fact a faculty granted to official or banking 
institutions, with the purpose of facilitating the realization of the pledge avoiding delays and expenses to 
the benefit of both parties.” 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have become valuable corporate assets. 
Trademarks create brand name recognition facilitating the sale of everything from 
household items to clothing to computers. Patents provide the method whereby 
inventions and machinery engender new technology, products and services. Copyrights 
protect the right in artistic, literary, musical, architectural, and other graphic work, to 
enable a creator to exploit his or her work. As our world is moving fast into the 
information age, those assets will continue to rapidly increase in value. 
 In fact, as a consequence of that move, the use of IPRs as collateral has became a 
common practice in corporate financing schemes. To facilitate such use, perfection of 
security interest in IPRs should be a simple process.  In other words, the time has come 
for the enactment of laws which definitively decide how security interest in IP should be 
perfected. 
 In the United States, until some reform proposal is implemented, commercial 
transactions that depend on IP collateral will continue to suffer from heightened costs 
caused by uncertainty as to how creditors’ security interest are perfected and obtain 
priority over other claimants.275 As mentioned, the statutory and regulatory framework 
and the relevant case law present anachronism and anomalies that urgently require 
                                                 
275 See Alice Haemmerli, supra note 1, at 1762 
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solution. The ABA Task Force approach enjoys considerable support and may well 
influence the shape of the legislative response.276 
 The Argentinean system appears to be simple and effective, however because of 
its relatively untested legal history, it is difficult to evaluate more deeply its legal and 
practical effectiveness. This scenario presents some issues that beg for an improvement. 
For example, the language of the Law for Registered Pledges and Decrees is very broad 
regarding the possibility to pledge “all rights to commercial, industrial or artistic nature.” 
Moreover, it is at best very doubtful whether there is any interest in creating collateral in 
unregistered intangible rights (i.e. know-how, trade secrets, or trade dress), as they would 
have little or no practical effect.277  In today’s legal scheme, such rights may be pledged 
as forming part of the “fondo de comercio,” which under Argentine law may be defined 
as the “going concern including goodwill and all assets and rights whether tangible or 
intangible,” but it would be of little practical value to create a separate pledge.278 
 It should be noted that, despite the effort placed into finding the most effective 
way of creating security interests in IP rights, there is no one correct answer, and it is 
similarly impractical to say that any one system is more efficient than any other. The 
reason for both of these statements is that IP law must evolve to meet the needs of a 
specific nation or jurisdiction, each of which has different ways of doing business and 
different economic realities to contend with. 
 In fact, both Argentina and the U.S. have spent a lot of time in recent years 
finding ways to most effectively allow security interests to be created using IP, and thus 
                                                 
276  See Melvin Simensky, supra note 11 at 8 
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allow increased use of this technique to promote economic development and expansion. 
However, it is highly unlikely that what eventually works in the U.S. or Argentina will be 
the “right” answer for any other country, as it is a virtual impossibility to say that there 
could be any universal “right” answer, as the economic and business circumstances vary 
so widely between every country on the globe. 
 Therefore, the responsibility to develop an effective and efficient system of using 
IP to create security interests lies on the shoulders of each country individually. The truth 
of the matter is that clients in Argentina, the U.S., and every country across the world are 
waiting, and the importance of creating a solution grows every passing day. As one 
commentator has noted, “There is simply too much money at stake to permit continued 
ambiguity in the use of IP in commercial transactions.”279 
 
                                                 
279 See Melvin Simensky, supra note 11 at 7 
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